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Introduction
To maintain information dominance, we must commit to improving our ability to influence target audiences and manipulate our adversary's information environment. Continued development of these capabilities is essential.
-General Tommy Franks
Throughout this paper I will address the need to evolve prevailing PA norms and standards to effectively employ information capabilities to achieve operational effects throughout the full spectrum of military conflict. This discussion will begin by examining the evolution of the post Cold-War international security environment and the impact of globalization and the drastic change in the nature and range of military operations. Today's military operations are increasing being played out in a wide variety of dynamic and challenging environments ranging from low intensity conflict against armed insurgencies employing terrorist tactics to humanitarian and stability operations. This has become an even greater concern in light of the emergence of the information revolution of the 90's. 1 The information revolution has provided the means to enable increasing opportunities and asymmetric advantages for non-state actors and rogue nations to wield enormous effect, thereby leveling the playing field against great powers. In this new era, modern global communication technologies and real-time international media coverage have emerged as distinctive new warfighting capabilities, with profound implications for national security.
Within this context, it's reasonable to conclude the military's growing involvement in conflicts waged for less than national survival will be placed under greater scrutiny, with public support playing an integral role in the success or failure of the overall intended political objectives.
Unfortunately, the prevailing norms and standards for PA operations have failed to evolve military PA operations beyond past practices to address today's security challenges and associated global information age realities. As the traditional employment of conventional hard military power decreases, the asymmetric employment of information as a warfighting capability will become increasingly important. A failure to evolve PA operations to address the 21st century military operational environment will result in missed opportunities to deliver operational effects necessary to accomplish national security objectives.
Success in this changing strategic context will thus require more than military might alone to achieve desired end states, with the achievement of national policy objectives increasingly dependent upon personnel armed with information versus iron and lead. Within this context, PA operations have never been a more integral part of warfighting. Without question, kinetic capabilities are still relevant in 21 st century warfare, but represent only part of the solution. Military success in wielding information for operational effect will increasingly depend upon our ability to move forward on many fronts, to include evolving PA operations designed to preempt or counter adversary disinformation. Unfortunately, little beyond lip service has been paid to evolve military PA operations beyond past practices to address today's security challenges and associated global information age realities. Now more than ever steps must be taken to increase organizational efficiencies, thereby achieving the speed and synergies necessary to anticipate and thwart adversary efforts to manipulate the information domain.
Doing so will require evolving prevailing PA norms and standards to effectively employ information capabilities to achieve operational effects throughout the full spectrum of military conflict. The recommendations and conclusions of this paper will present viable solutions to enhance exisiting practices designed to confront existing threats and maintain our military advantage in the war for public opinion. Remarking on the importance of the population while conducting unconventional military operations during Operation Iraqi Freedom, Marine Corps Lt. Gen. James N. Mattis noted, "this is the kind of war where ammunition at times is better spent…trying to make common cause with the people. This is not a war that can be won purely by military means." 22 Increasing the likelihood of achieving a successful outcome under these new circumstances will require a strategy focused on delivering information effects designed to shape and influence perceptions. 
Military Implications of Globalization

Chapter 4 The Evolving Character of War
Victory smiles upon those who anticipate the changes in the character of war, not upon those who wait to adapt themselves after the changes occur.
-Guilio Douhet
Throughout history the character of warfare has evolved to create greater complexity in war. Factors ranging from the situation and context of conflict to the evolution of capabilities and technology have served to both empower and constrain military commanders throughout the ages. To increase the likelihood of achieving success, military leaders have evolved prevailing norms and standards to achieve desired political end states. An analysis of historical trends serves to illustrate the evolving character of warfare.
For instance, during the pre-Napoleonic era, the outcome of warfare was often waged for limited political objectives to include the seizure of small parcels of land with a single battle often determining the outcome of war. 24 European armies tended to be small and limited in their scope and means to achieve desired end states with tactics typically limited to close order drill to mass troops employing muskets aimed at the opposing force. During the 18 th Century, organizational innovations introduced by Napoleon afforded the previously unprecedented decentralized conduct of operations. This evolution in the character of war enabled greater maneuver and speed enabling him to quickly and efficiently overcome opposing armies. an industrial nation's vital centers. Moreover, the employment of airpower during conflict sought to achieve greater wartime efficiency and reduce the overall duration of conflict. 27 The evolution of the post-Cold War international security environment is no exception to this trend evolution of the character of war.
Unlike previous large-scale conventional wars focused on the kinetic destruction of the enemy army and associated infrastructure, success in current operations are increasingly defined by the effective and efficient use of information to win the "battle of ideas." In the 21 st century, adversaries unable to match conventional U.S. military forces have increasingly employed modern communication technologies and global media outlets as asymmetric weapons of mass influence. Instead of massing forces through the Fulda Gap, today's enemy attempts to achieve parity with U.S. forces by massing information effects on the battlefield of public opinion. As a result, adversaries can exploit media outlets by transmitting propaganda or disinformation in hopes of swaying domestic and international support, opinion and resolve. 28 The formerSecretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld underscored this evolving character of warfare by noting:
The conflict we're in is not against a big army or a big navy or a big air force. The United States military is not going to lose a single war or battle or skirmish over in Iraq or Afghanistan. The competition that's taking place, the battle that's taking place is for people's minds, and very much they are convinced that they can affect the will of the American people and the American people's willingness to persist in this effort.
So too, Al-Qaida has media committees. They go out and they plan exactly how they can structure their attacks to have the kind of drama and effect that will be carried worldwide, that will have the effect of intimidating people and persuading people on the one hand that they should not oppose the terrorists, and on the other hand that they should be recruited or contribute money. They can dramatize the success of what they're doing, and that increases the contributions they get from people who support that type of thing. So it is an entirely different environment that we're functioning in, it's a difficult one, and it requires a set of skills that the United States government and inspire violence designed to discredit government legitimacy and authority. Imagery featuring beheadings, improvised-explosive device bombings projected against U.S. forces and online newspapers are also routinely employed to disseminate information with ease that may be accessed by the global masses. This is of particular concern for U.S. forces, increasingly engaged in conducting SSTR operations in a COIN environment where government legitimacy is paramount. 34 The revolution in global communications capability has also resulted in the exponential growth of media outlets and accelerated global news cycles. According to former Assistant Secretary of Defense Joseph Nye, in today's real-time media environment, "an hour -or even a few minutes-makes the critical difference whether a cable television network is on top of a story or behind the curve." 35 Of particular concern is the potential effect these outlets and related coverage have on the opinions of the global community, with implications to potentially shift domestic public opinion and support for military operations. Increasingly we've seen the outcome of post-Cold War conflicts less dependent on how well they're fought on the battlefield, versus how they are perceived in the information domain, with news journalists' wielding great influence in how the world responds. 36 What has come to be known as the "Cable News Network effect," has served to illustrate the influence of pervasive media coverage to increasingly influence public opinion and policymaking.
One of the first wartime examples of the powerful influence of the CNN effect was witnessed during Operation Desert Storm. During this conflict, F-117 stealth fighters struck the Al-Firdus command-and-control bunker resulting in the deaths of hundreds of Iraqi civilians.
According to the Coalition Force Air Component Commander, General Chuck Horner, the resulting CNN television coverage highlighting dead Iraqi's being removed from the facility resulted in immediate impacts to the air operation.
Targeting in the Baghdad area all but stopped, and General Schwarzkopf began to anguish over every target we nominated, denying approval of most of them. Okay, this change was not in fact hard to accept. Most of the known high-value targets had already been destroyed or heavily damaged, and by then our main thrust had turned to destroying tanks, artillery, and lines of communications in the KTO. But a notion sticks in my throat that someone above the CINC had issued guidance based on fear of public opinion polls.
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With this example in mind, it is reasonable to conclude the careful employment of future military operations will be critical to reduce the potential negative fallout resulting from the perception of indiscriminate destruction and inappropriate application of military power. For instance, despite superior U.S. military capabilities and modern precision guided munitions, military operations will inevitably result in mistakes resulting in collateral damage and civilian deaths. This is especially relevant when conducting operations in a COIN environment where undermining public support is counterproductive to achieving long-term success. Given that non-peer adversaries will be unlikely to achieve parity with conventional U.S. Fortunately for the coalition, Belgrade's attempts to win the 'war for public opinion' were ultimately unsuccessful. Nevertheless, a thorough understanding of the lessons drawn from these historical military operations is critical to understanding the conditions which future operations will be conducted. Doing so will increase the likelihood of evolving operations to achieve greater operational effectiveness, given the current nature and character of war.
The necessity to evolve military operations to address the current geopolitical context has not been lost upon our nation's senior leaders. For instance, the '02 U.S. National Security Strategy noted, "…the major institutions of American national security strategy were designed in a different era to meet different requirements. All of them must be transformed." 41 Since that time the Department of Defense (DoD) has been slow to embrace change, instead emphasizing preparation for traditional conventional large-scale wars versus smaller unconventional conflicts our forces currently find themselves engaged. Unfortunately, this trend has extended to the PA career field, which has failed to evolve beyond prevailing norms and standards to address today's security challenges and associated global information-age realities.
For instance, in an era which presumably necessitates increased emphasis on strategic communication and associated personnel, the USAF has conducted significant PA manpower Beyond correcting existing manpower shortcomings, fully realizing the operational potential of PA capabilities will require a new framework to create a capability that is relevant on the 21 st century battlefield. The speed of information enabled by modern technology demands the evolution of PA norms and standards to achieve the speed and synergies required to win the war for public opinion. Developing this capability to frame the public debate and mitigate setbacks resulting from adversary efforts to manipulate the cognitive battlespace will ensure military forces maintain the freedom of action to conduct operations designed to achieve national security objectives.
Chapter 6
Recommendations and Conclusions
The epitome of skill is to defeat your enemy without physically engaging him in battle.
-Sun Szu
Evolving existing PA operational norms and standards to address today's security challenges and related global information-age realities will require moving beyond outdated concepts and reactive Cold War era practices of the past. Doing otherwise risks failure to meet existing operational conditions, thereby becoming an increasingly irrelevant player among joint military operations. Moving beyond prevailing norms and standards will require a crossdisciplined effort among PA, Psychological Operations (PSYOP) and Public Diplomacy (PD) to increase operational efficiencies designed to achieve strategic communication.
This recommendation would be accomplished by implementing a two pronged approach. Operations Center or Joint Force Air Component Commanders Air Operations Center during major combat operations is also recommended. Doing so would achieve the speed, cooperation and collaboration necessary to influence target audiences and counter adversary efforts to manipulate the information domain. Despite U.S. technological superiority and modern precision guided munitions, military operations will inevitably result in collateral damage and civilian deaths resulting in negative implications. Further, the speed of information in modern conflict will require real-time collaboration to maintain the information edge over potential adversaries.
In an era of accelerated global media, preserving the capacity to deliver proactive, timely information in this environment is critical to maintaining public support and avoiding potential setbacks resulting from adversary propaganda and disinformation campaigns. By releasing disinformation or propaganda to global media outlets regarding these events, adversaries will attempt to drive a wedge between the public and coalition military forces. To quote from Joint PA doctrine, "Gaining and maintaining the information initiative in a conflict can help discredit and undermine enemy propaganda. The first side that presents the information sets the context and frames the public debate." The capabilities and potential political consequences resulting from the asymmetric use of information to elevate an issue on a global scale within seconds cannot be underestimated.
Unable to match U.S. conventional military strength, adversaries will increasingly attempt to exploit the asymmetric means of modern media technologies and international news outlets to exploit these mistakes or transmit propaganda in hopes of swaying domestic and international support, opinion and resolve. The establishment of an embedded JIEC capability is critical to ensuring the speed and synergy necessary to mitigate adversary efforts to manipulate the information domain and accomplish JFC objectives.
Conclusion
The central problem addressed throughout this paper is the need to evolve prevailing PA norms and standards to effectively employ information capabilities to achieve operational effects in the current information environment. As we've seen throughout recent history, the evolution in the nature of conflict and character of war have created conditions where military success is increasingly defined by the ability effectively and efficiently leverage information as weapon designed to win the war for public opinion. In particular, the 21 st century security environment, "hammer" without first considering a more holistic approach to imposing the nations will upon an adversary. What has become known as the "American Way of War" has become a predictable established pattern which strives to achieve the climactic decisive battle, seeking to swiftly annihilate enemy forces in a single engagement. 
